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This thesis presents a study on the issue of Automobile Insurance Fraud. The purpose of 
this study is to increase knowledge concerning fraudulent claims in the Portuguese market, 
while raising awareness to the use of Data Mining techniques towards this, and other 
similar problems. 
We conduct an application of data mining techniques to the problem of predicting 
automobile insurance fraud, shown to be of interest to insurance companies around the 
world. We present fraud definitions and conduct an overview of existing literature on the 
subject. Live policy and claim data from the Portuguese insurance market in 2005 is used to 
train a Logit Regression Model and a CHAID Classification and Regression Tree.  
The use of Data Mining tools and techniques enabled the identification of underlying fraud 
patterns, specific to the raw data used to build the models. The list of potential fraud 
indicators includes variables such as the policy’s tenure, the number of policy holders, not 
admitting fault in the accident or fractioning premium payments semiannually. Other 
variables such as the number of days between the accident and the patient filing the claim, 
the client’s age, and the geographical location of the accident were also found to be relevant 
in specific sub-populations of the used dataset. 
Model variables and coefficients are interpreted comparatively and key performance results 
are presented, including PCC, sensitivity, specificity and AUROC. Both the Logit Model 
and the CHAID C&R Tree achieve fair results in predicting automobile insurance fraud in 
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The focus of this thesis is to present the issue of automobile insurance fraud, and how 
insurance companies might use data mining tools and techniques to predict and prevent 
insurance fraud. While the methods presented herein will be applied specifically to an 
automobile insurance dataset, their applicability to other industries, such as healthcare, 
credit cards and customer retention, has also been the subject of various articles throughout 
the years. 
The first section of this thesis will provide background information on the matter of 
insurance fraud. We will establish the relevant definitions and present the problem 
statement, showing facts that attempt to depict the impact and usefulness of predicting 
insurance fraud. Additionally, in the first section we will present an overview of existing 
literature covering this subject. 
Once the initial definitions have been established, the second part will focus on presenting 
the dataset on which the process will be implemented, including summary statistics for the 
380 selected claims, concerning a total of 17 relevant variables. Real insurance data is used, 
from a Top 10 insurance company operating in the Portuguese market, from the year of 
2005. Data used herein is usually available in most databases set up by insurance 
companies. 
The third section of this thesis will focus on presenting the data mining tools and 
techniques used in the following chapters. The theory behind the logistic regression models, 
as well as the statistics that enable interpretation and performance evaluation, will be 
detailed to some extent. Classification and Regression Trees will also be covered in the 
same manner. Additionally, we will illustrate the use of the software package SPSS 
Modeler, which was used to conduct several of the techniques detailed in this thesis. 
From that point onward, this thesis will present the results obtained from predicting 





and Regression Trees. A comparative summary will be presented, highlighting the 






2. Automobile Insurance Fraud 
Overview 
Through an insurance policy, the policyholder and the insurance company agree to the 
terms on which certain risks will be covered. If both parties behave honestly and share the 
same information, the premium paid by the insured, as well as the compensation due by the 
insurer, will adequately reflect the probability of the loss event occurring and the implicit 
estimated loss (plus the insurer’s profit margin). However, and as written by Artís et al. 
(2002), the behavior of the insured is not always honest. 
To this matter, a study conducted by Accenture in 2003, and quoted by Wilson (2005), 
presented evidence suggesting that an average US adult is not entirely against insurance 
fraud. In the referred study, 24% of 1.030 enquiries stated that it can be somewhat 
acceptable to overstate the value of a claim, while 11% might not condone submitting 
claims for items not actually lost or damaged. To further understand this issue, one should 
note that it was also portrayed that 49% of people interviewed believed that they would be 
able to evade detection, if they were to commit insurance fraud. The moral issue behind 
people’s view on insurance fraud can also be found in Artís et al. (1999), which provides an 
attempt at modeling consumer behavior through a consumer’s utility function, by assessing 
the expected value of committing fraud. 
Most types of fraudulent behavior can be construed as information asymmetry leaned 
towards the policy holder. In other words, fraud occurs when the insured possesses more 
information than the insurer (Artís et al. (1999)). A policy holder that does not divulge to 
the insurance company, any information that could influence the probability of the loss 
event occurring, or information on the damages resulting from any such loss event, is 
committing insurance fraud.  
It is not easy, however, for an insurance company, to identify and prove that fraudulent 
behavior is behind a specific claim. While predictive models can sometimes reveal the 





claims, models alone will not prevent the insurer from reimbursing the insured, to account 
for his losses. In order to prove that a claim is indeed fraudulent, the insurer must incur in 
additional costs to conduct the necessary investigations and audit the claim. 
Thus, for the insurance company to save money spent on fraudulent claims, it is not only 
necessary that fraudulent claims are detected and indemnities not paid, but also the audit 
costs required to detect fraud must be kept as low as possible. Since it is impossible to audit 
every single claim, the difficulty that this thesis attempts to overcome is the selection of 
which claims to audit, i.e., which claims are most likely fraudulent, allowing the insurer to 
save money if audited?  
According to Caron & Dionne (1998), in studies conducted in the Canadian market, 10 to 
21.8% of indemnities are paid to fraudulent claims. More so, Snider & Tam (1996) quotes 
conventional wisdom in the industry (United States) to support that 10 to 20% of all 
indemnities are spent on automobile insurance fraud claims.  
The literature 
The study of Automobile Insurance Fraud has been approached in many different ways, 
with articles published on the matter of insurance fraud detection systems dating back over 
20 years. However, and as mentioned, the methods presented in the following sections have 
been applied to other industries, such as healthcare, credit card fraud and customer 
retention, and depicted in various articles throughout the years. 
The approach more commonly found in existent literature, and that greatly contributed to 
this work, is centered on the practical complexities faced by an insurer attempting to predict 
fraud. 
Wilson (2005), Artís et al. (2002) and Artís et al. (1999) are three examples of this kind of 
approach. Using data from insurance companies in different countries, these authors present 
definitions of fraud with different levels of detail and move on to modeling auto insurance 
fraud in the used datasets. For this purpose, logistic regressions were applied to help 





used a standard Logistic Regression model to detect auto insurance fraud, Artís et al. 
(1999) approached the issue through a Multinomial Logit Model and a Nested Multinomial 
Logit Model. Artís et al. (2002) applies the same Logit Models but with correction factors, 
given the assumption that the group of claims identified as honest may contain a portion of 
fraudulent claims not identified, i.e., accounting for omission error. Caudill et al. (2005) 
further investigates the probability of a claim having been misclassified as honest, when 
predicting auto insurance fraud. 
In a similar way, but using different techniques, Bhowmik (2010) focused on classifying 
auto insurance fraud claims as honest or fraudulent, using Naïve Bayesian Classification 
Network and Decision Tree-Based algorithms to analyze patterns from the data. The 
performance of such models was also measured. 
Belhadji et al. (2010) derived from this approach by first querying domain experts on the 
subject of which variables (attributes) might be best fraud indicators. The authors then 
calculated conditional probabilities of fraud for each indicator and performed Probit 
regressions to determine the most significant fraud indicators, comparing results to those 
expected by insurance experts. 
Some articles, such as Viaene (2002) and Phua et al. (2010), have taken a broader 
approach. Viaene (2002) compared how different modeling algorithms performed in the 
same data-mining problem, and using the same dataset. Logistic regressions, C4.5 decision 
trees, k-nearest neighbor clustering, Bayesian networks, support vector machines and naïve 
Bayes were contrasted. Alternatively, Phua et al. (2010) is said to have collected, compared 
and summarized most technical and review articles covering automated fraud detection in 
the years 2000-2010. 
Further work of comparing data-mining tools and techniques was performed in Derrig & 
Francis (2005), specifically analyzing the performance of different methodologies, such as 
classification and regression trees, neural networks, regression splines and naïve Bayes 
classification, when compared to Logistic Regression Models. While, in Viaene (2002), it 





auto insurance fraud, Derrig & Francis (2005) depicted other methods that were able to 
improve on the Logit results.  
Smith et al. (2000) provides an example of a broader application of data mining techniques, 
focusing not only on insurance fraud patterns, but also on analyzing the issue of customer 
retention and presenting a case study for both. 
Finally, and to conclude this section, it should be noted that most of the literature 
referenced in this thesis is what Tennyson & Salsas-Forn (2002) mentions as the statistical 
approach. A different approach, researched but not followed in this work, covers the 
theoretical design of optimal auditing strategies in the matter of insurance claims. The 
purpose of such audit strategies is to minimize the total costs incurred, including both the 
expected audit costs and the costs of undetected fraud. According to the authors, this kind 
of analysis is more focused on the deterrence of insurance fraud, i.e. its prevention, rather 
than its detection after occurrence. However, this line of work fell beyond the scope of this 
thesis. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the range of characteristics (variables) 
considered in this kind of analysis is fairly narrow, and does not follow the complexities 





3. Modeling Automobile Insurance Fraud 
Available Information 
All the procedures described in this thesis were conducted on a dataset of information from 
2005. The dataset consists of real data belonging to an insurance company operating in the 
Portuguese market, with a total of over 200.000 claims, occurring from 2002 to 2005, and 
characterized on various subjects, including, but not limited to, information on the 
contract/policy, the policy holder, the accident and also the company’s action to evaluate 
the loss event and ascertain the compensation to pay or, on the contrary, determine if a kind 
of fraud has occurred. 
Information on the contract ranges from the date of signature to the identification of the 
specific risks that the policy holder is choosing to cover in such contract. Information on 
the number of policy holders and the frequency of premium payments is also available. 
Insurance companies already keep track of any changes in contract specifications, and also 
any previous loss events associated with the contract. 
On the policy holder, social and demographic variables are available, beyond age and 
gender, including profession, address, etc. Additionally, information on the client’s 
portfolio of insurance products as a policy holder is also recorded, enabling access to 
records of the client’s history of loss events. 
Furthermore, specific variables characterize the loss event itself, as of the date the policy 
holder reports such loss event. Variables in this set of information allow us to determine the 
elapsed time between the date and time of the accident and those of the customer’s claim, 
as well as the geographical location of the event (rural areas, urban areas), but also whether 
the client recognized his own fault in the accident, and which type of accident. 
Additionally, vehicle characteristics are reported as of the date of the accident, such as 
vehicle age or if the vehicle retained moving capacity after the accident, as well as an 
estimate of its market value. At this point, the insurer may or may not decide to investigate 





Finally, a set of variables was available that represented details of the remainder of any 
insurance process. Estimated and effective repair costs, in both time and money, leading to 
the amount of compensation paid or the reason for which it was not paid, such as the 
identification of fraud. 
For the purpose of this thesis, variables used were the ones available to the insurance 
company at the time the claim was filed. This rationale was set with the purpose of 
establishing a model that the insurer might use and infer a probability of fraud for a claim, 
as soon as it is filed. 
Further considering variables available, and as will be detailed in the next chapter, it is 
important to note that not all variables described in this section could be used in the models 
that follow, mainly due to data quality issues. While it was considered relevant to show that 
the insurance company has developed the capacity to collect information on the referred 
matters, most variables presented missing values for most claims, rendering those variables 
unusable for statistical purposes. 
Additionally, it should be noted that only the subset of audited claims was studied to 
formulate the predictive models, consisting of 6.485 claims (approximately 3% of all 
claims), of which 96 were proven to be fraudulent. It is clear that most insurers’ datasets 
carry the same limitation: as in Artís et al. (2002) and Artís et al. (1999), only claims that 
have been proven fraudulent actually feed the models developed in this kind of work. There 
is little doubt that a percentage of claims considered honest in the data set may be, in truth, 
undetected insurance fraud. This is likely to be true even for investigated claims, but is 
assumed in this thesis to be less prevalent. As so, by narrowing down the dataset to study 
only investigated claims, one can hope to improve the accuracy of the insurer’s 
classification of each claim as fraudulent or honest, i.e., the probability of an honest claim 
actually being honest, given the fact that the claim has been investigated, is greater than the 





The data used in the model 
To prepare the data for modeling, a subset of 380 claims was extracted from the original 
dataset, consisting of 200 randomly selected honest claims and 180 fraudulent claims. Due 
to the reduced number of fraudulent claims, these observations were duplicated using a 
simplified version of Artís et al. (2002) and Artís et al. (1999)’s oversampling techniques. 
In what concerns the variables used in the model, names and descriptions are described in 
the following table. One should note, however, that not all of the variables described in the 
previous section were available, mainly due to missing information for most claims.  
 
Variable Name Description 
Client_Tenure* 
Number of years since the customer signed his first insurance 
contract with the insurer 
Policy_Tenure* Number of years since the policy was signed 
Vehic_Age* Age of the insured vehicle, in years 
Num_People* Number of people involved in the accident 
Num_Policy_Holders* Number of policy holders 
Num_days_to_claim* Days between the accident date and the date the claim was filed 
Num_auto_events* 
Number of automobile accidents recorded for the customer (all 
policies with the insurer) 
Num_policy_events* Number of automobile accidents recorded for the policy 
Client_Age* Age of the customer, in years 
Semiannual_Payments 1, if premiums are paid on a semi-annually basis, 0 otherwise 
No_Fault 
1, if the customer did not assume his fault in the accident, 0 
otherwise 
Weekend 1, if the accident occurred on a weekend, 0 otherwise 
Morning_event 1, if the accident occurred in the morning, 0 otherwise 
Night_event 1, if the accident occurred at night, 0 otherwise 
ModUrban_Area 1, if the accident occurred in a moderately urban area, 0 otherwise 
Rural_Area 1, if the accident occurred in a rural area, 0 otherwise 
Different_Area_event 
1, if the accident occurred in a different geographical location 
from the insured's residence, 0 otherwise 
* Variables rescaled (standardized) before entering the Logit model. 
Summary statistics are calculated for the presented variables and shown in the following 
table. These statistics were computed in relation to the target variable Fraud. One should 





note that, even for variables that were to be rescaled later in the process, statistics presented 
here refer to the used sample of 380 claims, using variables in their original state. 
 
Variable Name 
Fraudulent Claims Honest Claims Total Sample 
Average StDev Average StDev Average StDev 
Client_Tenure 4,14 5,52 5,85 6,28 5,04 5,98 
Policy_Tenure 1,99 2,84 3,62 4,33 2,85 3,79 
Vehic_Age 7,22 5,03 7,22 5,34 7,22 5,19 
Num_People 1,56 0,72 1,53 0,66 1,54 0,69 
Num_Policy_Holders 2,00 1,19 2,65 1,27 2,34 1,27 
Num_days_to_claim 10,23 17,97 13,02 34,58 11,70 27,97 
Num_auto_events 2,38 2,52 2,20 1,67 2,28 2,11 
Num_policy_events 1,63 1,04 1,72 1,21 1,68 1,13 
Client_Age 39,28 13,36 42,02 13,96 40,69 13,72 
Semiannual_Payments 0,32 0,47 0,19 0,39 0,25 0,44 
No_Fault 0,30 0,46 0,18 0,38 0,23 0,42 
Weekend 0,34 0,48 0,32 0,47 0,33 0,47 
Morning_event 0,11 0,32 0,09 0,29 0,10 0,30 
Night_event 0,17 0,37 0,14 0,34 0,15 0,36 
ModUrban_Area 0,21 0,41 0,35 0,48 0,28 0,45 
Rural_Area 0,16 0,36 0,08 0,26 0,11 0,32 
Different_Area_event 0,73 0,44 0,64 0,48 0,68 0,47 
These differences will be further analyzed in the results section, concerning their impact in 
the resulting models. 
  





4. Tools and Techniques 
Data Mining Methodology 
The use of data mining techniques and methodologies to extract meaningful information 
from large information systems has been widely accepted, as proven by the extensive 
literature discussed above. To quote only one other, Smith et al. (2000) has stated that: 
Data mining has proven to be a useful approach for attacking this [insurance claim 
patterns] suite of problems. Each of the sub problems required a different technique and 
approach, yet the methodology of data mining discussed (…) provided for a logical fusion 
of the analysis. Rather than using a single technique for solving a single problem, data 
mining provides a collection of techniques and approaches that help to fully integrate the 
solutions with existing business knowledge and implementation. 
The purpose of this exercise is not, however, to have a mathematical model provide a 
definite decision about a claim being fraudulent, but rather to estimate a level of similarity 
between that claim and others that were identified as fraudulent. The recommended 
decision is then whether to investigate such claim or not. As referenced by Caudill et al. 
(2005), using a scoring method to identify fraudulent claims can be useful when 
implementing a claim auditing strategy.  
To best take advantage of existing technology when detecting automobile insurance fraud, 
we selected the software package SPSS Modeler to perform all techniques that might help 
us identify the most contributing factors and build models, through which one might 
estimate a fraud propensity for any given claim, given a set of its characteristics. 
SPSS Modeler 
All statistic procedures included in this work were conducted using SPSS Modeler. SPSS 
Modeler is a window based software package that enables the use of basic and advanced 






Work in SPSS Modeler is conducted through a process flow diagram designed by the user, 
selecting which techniques to use from a list of predefined nodes. Many variants are 
available for each technique, and careful consideration should be employed to navigate all 
the options presented.  
Logistic Regression – Model Definition 
For the purpose of automobile insurance fraud, let us define a logistic regression model to 
explain   
 , which represents the incentive (or utility, in economic terms) of the insured to 
commit fraud, in any claim  . Since logistic models are usually defined in a latent variable 
context (Artís et al. (2002)), it seems adequate that   
  is unobservable. Nevertheless, one 
can define the regression model: 
  
           (1) 
In the presented model,   is the vector of explanatory variables, in this model weighted by 
vector   of the unknown regression parameters.    is a residual term. 
In insurance claim datasets, one cannot observe the utility of the insured when committing 
fraud. The only available information is dichotomous: whether the claim was identified as 
fraudulent or honest. This information can be stored in variable   , defined as follows: 
    , if   
    
    , otherwise. 
Assuming that there is no undetected fraud, the probability of fraud can be derived, using 
(1), in the following manner: 





                     
                  
     
Which, by letting F be the cumulative distribution function of the residual term   , means: 
                        
        
     (2) 
Please note that the absence of undetected fraud is a simplification taken in this thesis and 
not a pre-requisite of this kind of analysis. Artís et al. (2002), among others, have 
considered the possibility of misclassification in the response variable, covering the matter 
in their studies.  
In order to estimate the parameter vector   , one can use the maximum likelihood method 
through the maximization of the log-likelihood function. The generic method will not be 
derived in this thesis but allows the reader to arrive at the following equation, by assuming 
the residual term    above follows a logistic distribution: 
                 
     
  
   
    
   
 (3) 
Thus, and once parameters   are estimated, equation (3) enables the user to assign, through 
a set of assumptions, a probability-like score that a claim   is fraudulent, given its 
characteristics   . 
Classification and Regression Trees – CHAID – Model Definition 
An alternative procedure that may provide answers to the issue of predicting insurance 
fraud is the use of Classification and Regression Trees. Also known as segmentation trees, 
decision trees or recursive partitioning, C&R Trees have been used frequently as both 
exploratory tools, as well as predictive tools (Ritschard (2010)). 
For the purpose of this thesis, the CHAID variation of C&R Trees will be used. CHAID 
means Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detector, which, according to Ritschard (2010), is 





The implementation of a model based on a CHAID Tree was first suggested in Kass (1980), 
and follows a specific algorithm, consisting of 3 global steps: Merging, Splitting and 
Stopping. The C&R tree grows by repeatedly applying the following algorithm, starting 
from the root node, i.e., the complete dataset on which it is used (or the full training sample, 
as we will see in the results section). 
Globally, the algorithm will determine the best split for each potential predictor and then 
select the predictor whose split presents the most significant differences in sub-populations 
of the training sample, i.e., the lowest p-value for the chi-squared significance test. 
Each of these steps will now be described in further detail: 
1. Merging 
The first part of the algorithm consists of grouping categories in the predictor, or 
independent, variables. If a predictor is categorical, this part of the algorithm will merge 
non-significant categories, i.e., any two categories that show the most similar distribution, 
when compared to the target variable (fraud). The most similar distribution is found by 
comparing p-values of the Pearson's chi-squared test. 
For ordinal predictor, the same method will apply, but only adjacent categories can be 
merged. Numerical predictors are grouped into exclusive and exhaustive ordinal variables 
and then treated as such. 
The outcome of this step is the identification, for each predictor, of the optimal way to 
merge categories of that predictor, as well as the optimal p-value for that predictor. 
2. Splitting 
Taking the outcome of the first part as input, this part of the algorithm will simply select 
the predictor with the smallest p-value in relation to the target variable. If the p-value is 
considered significant by the user, i.e. below a significance threshold defined by the user 
(in this case 5%), the tree is split using that predictor, with merged categories. Otherwise, 





When a new split is performed, the process restarts at the merging step, for each of the new 
nodes. 
3. Stopping 
For each node of the tree, the last part of the algorithm evaluates a set of stopping criteria. 
The node will not be split if, and only if, any of the following occurs: 
a) All records in that node have the same value in the target variable; 
b) All predictors have the same value for all records in that node; 
c) The maximum number of consecutive splits (tree depth), as defined by the user, has 
been reached; 
d) The number of records in the node is lower than a user-specified minimum; 
e) The selected split will create at least one node with a number of records lower than a 
user-specified minimum. 
When no other splits can be performed for any node in the tree, the tree growing algorithm 
finishes. 
Model Accuracy and Performance 
All predictive models must be evaluated in terms of accuracy and performance. In other 
models such as econometric ones, where most predicted variables are quantitative and 
continuous, model evaluation is performed by measuring the difference between the 
observed and the predicted values. The probability of a claim being fraudulent, however, is 
unobservable. Since the only observable variable in this context is the claim’s real 
classification as fraudulent or legitimate, the model must classify each claim accordingly, 
assigning a user-defined cut-off point to convert the score calculated in the previous section 
into a binary variable: fraudulent or honest. 
According to Derrig & Francis (2005), it is common for the cut-off point to be 0.5. This 





remaining claims will be predicted to be legitimate. However, one can select different cut-
off points for each model. In fact, the selected cut-off point should represent, as reminded 
by Viaene (2002), the misclassification costs. For the purpose of this thesis, however, the 
cost of predicting fraud for a legitimate claim is assumed to be the same as that of allowing 
a fraudulent claim to be indemnified. 
Viaene (2002) suggests that the most used evaluation and comparison statistic is the PCC, 
percentage correctly classified. PCC, along with other descriptive statistics, such as false 
positives, false negatives, sensitivity and specificity are the most often used to evaluate and 
compare model accuracy and predictive power. These can be calculated by defining a so-
called Confusion Matrix that combines the four possible outcomes when comparing the 
predicted classification with the observed one. 
Table 3 - Confusion Matrix for Binary Classification 
  Predicted 
Observed Legitimate Fraud 
Legitimate True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP) 
Fraud False Negative (FN) True Positive (TP) 
Sensitivity is the percentage of fraudulent claims that were predicted to be fraudulent. On 
the other hand, specificity is the proportion of legitimate claims predicted to be legitimate. 
Good models will tend to show high values for these statistics. When both sensitivity and 
specificity equal 1, the model is considered to be a perfect predictor in the dataset it was 
used. 
            
              
              
 
              
                             
 
            
             
                   
 
             
                             
 
Despite being useful statistics to evaluate model accuracy, sensitivity and specificity vary 
depending on the selected cut-off point. Thus, it is common to plot the two statistics over 
the range of selectable cut-off points. The most frequently used example of this technique is 





The ROC curve plots the pairs (sensitivity; 1 – specificity) computed for each cut-off point, 
allowing a graphical comparison of the overall accuracy of the model. ROC analysis may 
enable the following interpretation: Since model A’s sensitivity is higher than model B’s, 
for all levels of specificity, one can conclude that A usually performs more accurately than 
B, in the referenced dataset. 
 
 
ROC analysis, in general, may suffice to provide intuitive or informal model comparison, 
in terms of accuracy. However, like any graphical comparison, it may prove difficult to 
rank models whose ROC curves intersect, posing no direct dominance over one another. To 
overcome this limitation, one often computes the so-called AUROC, literally the area under 
the ROC curve. Models with higher AUROC are generally considered more accurate. 
One important matter must be addressed before the model is generated and the performance 
indicators are calculated. As part of the data mining methodology, it is recommended to 
divide the available dataset, i.e. to partition the data in a training sample and a test sample. 
While the training sample is used to generate the model, its performance is usually best 
evaluated in the test sample, a set of different claims not used in the building process. 
  







This section is focused on the application of theory presented in the previous section to the 
available dataset, further investigating the issue of predicting fraudulent claims in the 
automobile insurance industry. 
Model Variables and Coefficients 
The following table summarizes the model obtained through the described procedures: 
  
Variable Beta Std Error Wald Sig.** Level 
Constant -1,073 0,358 8,994 0,003 95% 
Client_Tenure* 0,121 0,241 0,253 0,615 NS 
Policy_Tenure* -0,635 0,233 7,427 0,006 95% 
Vehic_Age* 0,106 0,159 0,442 0,506 NS 
Num_People* -0,052 0,162 0,102 0,749 NS 
Num_policy_holders* -0,578 0,179 10,443 0,001 95% 
Num_days_to_claim* -0,200 0,156 1,651 0,199 NS 
Num_auto_events* 0,144 0,252 0,327 0,567 NS 
Num_policy_events* 0,241 0,226 1,138 0,286 NS 
Client_Age* -0,290 0,173 2,810 0,094 90% 
No_Fault 0,945 0,378 6,259 0,012 95% 
Weekend 0,279 0,346 0,653 0,419 NS 
Morning_event 0,350 0,552 0,402 0,526 NS 
Night_event 0,053 0,443 0,015 0,904 NS 
ModUrban_Area -0,289 0,348 0,693 0,405 NS 
Rural_Area 0,010 0,516 0,000 0,984 NS 
Different_Area_event 0,415 0,345 1,444 0,229 NS 
Semiannual_Payments 0,990 0,395 6,298 0,012 95% 
* Variables rescaled (standardized) before entering the Logit model. 
** P-values for the Wald test for significance 
Policy_Tenure is a significant variable in the model, suggesting that claims related to older 
insurance policies have a lower probability of being fraudulent. Client_Tenure, however, 





shows no relevant influence in the outcome. One possible interpretation is that the customer 
may establish some kind of loyalty towards an insurance company they’ve dealt with for a 
long time or at least considering a specific insurance policy. 
Client_Age has been identified as a significant variable in the model, portraying a tendency 
for younger people to more likely incur in fraudulent claims. This finding has been 
observed in other datasets, such as Artís et al. (2002), for instance. However, this variable 
is only significant at the 10% significance level, so caution is advised when interpreting its 
coefficient. 
The number of policy holders shows a negative influence in the outcome, suggesting that 
policies signed by a higher number of people are less likely to contain fraudulent claims. 
One could speculate that a policy holder with intent to commit fraud will probably want to 
minimize his relationship with the insurer, and therefore avoid providing additional 
information or sharing ownership of the policy. 
In the used dataset, the variable No_Fault has a positive impact on the estimated fraud 
probability. According to the model, accepting blame in the accident originating the claim 
increases the chance of the claim being legitimate. This result is contrary to that in Artís et 
al. (2002), where it was suggested that, in accepting the blame, claimants of that dataset 
might be hoping to reduce the probability of the claim being audited. However, and looking 
at the model in this thesis, an alternate proposition can be made that fraudulent claimants 
will not only try to obtain wrongful indemnities but also to do so without incurring in the 
premium aggravation associated with being blamed for an accident. 
The last significant variable identified in the model is Semiannual_Payments. The model 
suggests that policies with semiannual payments are more likely to contain fraudulent 
claims, when compared to annual payment policies. This result could indicate that 
claimants with intent to commit fraud may wish to reduce the initial investment by 
fractioning premium payments. Alternatively, one could speculate that there is a higher 





between fractioned payment of premiums and policy holder income could be found, so the 
speculation lacks justification. 
Model Accuracy and Performance – LOGIT 
As detailed in the previous sections, the most intuitive process to evaluate the accuracy of a 
classification model is to compare the predicted outcome with the true outcome, and 
calculate the number of correct predictions. The following confusion matrices summarize 
the results, for the 0.5 cut-off point:  
 
Training Sample 
    
Test Sample 
   Observed 
Classification 




Predicted Classification  
Honest Fraud Total 
 
Honest Fraud Total 
Honest 98 30 128 
 
Honest 52 20 72 
Fraud 39 60 99 
 
Fraud 33 48 81 
Total 137 90 227 
 
Total 85 68 153 
These confusion matrices represent a total PCC of approximately 69.6% for the Training 
Sample and 65.4% for the Test Sample, as seen in the following table: 
 
% Training Test 
PCC 69,6% 65,4% 
Sensitivity 60,6% 59,3% 
Specificity 76,6% 72,2% 
AUROC 75,3% 71,5% 
While these results are not the best, other studies have considered similar results to be 
acceptable (see Artís et al. (2002), for example). The difference between the training 
sample results and those of the test sample are expected and within normalcy, giving 
support to saying that the model is not too focused on the specificities of the training 
sample’s claims (little or no overfitting). The area under the ROC Curve, presented in the 
previous chapter, is 71.5% for the Test sample, which is commonly considered fair. 
Table 5 – Confusion Matrices for the Logit Model - Results 





As a final note for this section, the following table summarizes the different levels of 
overall accuracy delivered by the presented model, obtained by selecting different cut-off 




Percentage Correctly Classified (PCC) 
Training Sample Test Sample 
0% 43,6% 52,9% 
10% 46,3% 57,5% 
20% 51,5% 60,1% 
30% 62,1% 65,4% 
40% 67,8% 67,3% 
50% 69,6% 65,4% 
60% 70,5% 60,1% 
70% 68,3% 59,5% 
80% 58,1% 50,3% 
90% 57,3% 47,7% 
100% 56,4% 47,1% 
As mentioned, the selected cut-off for the model presented above was 50%: If the score 
calculated by the model was above this threshold, the claim was predicted to be fraudulent, 
and legitimate, otherwise. Table 7 indicates that selecting a different cut-off might return 
more accurate results: selecting 40% would net a 2 point increase in accuracy, for the test 
sample.  
Classification and Regression Trees (CHAID) 
As an alternate path to modeling automobile insurance fraud, a classification and regression 
tree model, using CHAID, was built with the same data set. This section covers the results 
in further detail. 
Model variables and tree design 
The CHAID tree selected to predict automobile insurance fraud, with the used dataset is 
depicted in Table 8 below. As for the technical conditions specified in the model execution, 





the minimum p-value required for splitting and merging was set to 0.05, with a minimum 
number of records in parent branch of 20, and a minimum in a child branch of 10. 
Additionally, it should be noted that, since the tree growth algorithm treats all variables as 
either categorical or ordinal, no standardizations were required for this step. 
 















event = 1 
Client_Age 
<= 29 
10 0,917 1 
Client_Age 
> 29 
11 0,538 1 
Different 
Area 
event = 0 
- 10 0,417 0 
Policy_Tenure 
in ]1.167; 1.50] 
- - 13 0,933 1 
Policy_Tenure 
in ]1.50; 4.75] 
- - 14 0,500 0 
Policy_Tenure 
> 4.75 
- - 10 0,250 0 
Num Policy 








Num days to 
claim <= 1 
- 10 0,083 0 
Num days to 
claim > 1 
ModUrban_Area 
= 1 
16 0,667 1 
ModUrban_Area 
= 0 
33 0,371 0 
Num Policy 




- - 16 0,389 0 
Client_Age 
in ]29; 48] 





- 11 0,538 1 
Client_Tenure 
> 3.25 
- 13 0,133 0 
Num Policy 
Holders > 4 
- - - 19 0,476 0 





According to the CHAID model, the number of policy holders in the claim’s policy is the 
first recommended split that should be applied (p-value of 0.000). This is consistent with 
what was found in the Logit model, since the number of policy holders significantly 
contributed to predicting fraud in that model as well. In this dataset, fraudulent claims 
appear to be differently distributed across 4 categories: 1 policy holder, 2 policy holders, 3 
and 4 or more than 4 policy holders, with a higher concentration of fraudulent claims, the 
lower the number of policy holders (on average). Possible interpretations of this were 
suggested in the analysis of the Logit model, partly explained by an intention to minimize 
the relationship with the insurance company, avoiding the involvement of any friends or 
relatives. 
For the second split, three different variables were used, depending on the number of policy 
holders identified in the first split: the policy’s tenure (p-value 0.001), the flag for 
indicating semiannual premium payments (0.039) and the client’s age (0.007). All three 
variables were considered relevant in the Logit model as well. 
Concerning policy tenure, for the sub-sample of claims with only one policy holder, it 
should be noted that the model predicts no fraudulent claims for policies with over 1.5 
years of tenure, reassuring the interpretation that a loyalty effect may be in place (as with a 
negative coefficient in the Logit model). 
Concerning semiannual payments, and as suggested by the Logit model, this data set shows 
a specifically higher concentration of fraudulent claims in policies that share this attribute. 
The CHAID tree predicts no legitimate claims for this node, and the same interpretation as 
the one for the Logit model applies: if premeditated fraud is in place, the insured may wish 
to reduce his/her initial investment but fractioning premium payments. 
The last of the second level splits, recommended for policies that have 3 or 4 policy 
holders, refers to the first policy holder’s age. According to this split, there is a lower 
concentration of fraudulent claims in the younger policy holders. While this same variable 
was found to be significant in the Logit model, the interpretations differ. No fraudulent 





48 years-old. However, it should be noted that the Logit model does not consider sub-
samples of the training data set. Thus, there is no necessary contradiction in this variable 
and no effects should be ruled out for this reason. 
For the third level of splits, and mostly due to the sample size being limited, only three 
nodes were split, of nine different nodes created by the two earlier splits. These splits 
revealed significant effects in variables Different Area Event (p-value 0.049), number of 
days between the accident and the filing of the claim (0.006) and the client’s tenure (0.012). 
The remaining nodes were considered terminal, as no splits were found for the defined 
stopping criteria. 
Different Area Event, a flag type variable that equals “1” if the accident occurred in a 
different geographical area from the insurer’s area of residence, is shown to be significant 
in this specific sub-sample. The CHAID tree suggests that, for fairly recent policies (under 
14 months since signing) with only one policy holder, claims tend to be more frequently 
fraudulent if the accident occurs in a different area than the client’s residence. This can be 
hypothesized as intent to avoid being recognized, for instance if the accident was simulated 
or caused intentionally. While this variable was not identified as significant in the Logit 
model, the same reasoning applies as above, since the CHAID algorithm focuses on 
different distributions in specific subsamples of the data set. Further to this third level split, 
an additional split is identified by the tree, distinguishing claims whose client’s age is under 
or above 29 years (p-value of the fourth level split 0.015). However, this split does not 
affect the predicted outcome for the selected cut-off, estimating two different propensity 
levels that still fall on the fraudulent side. 
According to the CHAID tree model, not paying premiums semiannually is no reason to 
rule out possible fraudulent behavior. The model suggests that, if the client takes 2 or more 
days, after the accident, to file the claim, there may still be a possibility that the claim is 
fraudulent. In fact, an additional fourth level split is suggested, predicting those claims as 






Lastly, the third level split using the client’s tenure, applicable to policies with 3 or 4 policy 
holders whose first policy holder is above 48 years of age, suggests different fraud 
distributions at the 3.25 years of tenure cut-off point. The loyalty effect described above 
seems to be particularly noticeable above a certain age. 
Model Accuracy and Performance – CHAID 
In a similar analysis to the one performed for the Logistic Regression model, we now 
present detailed performance results for the CHAID Classification and Regression defined 




    
Test Sample 
   Observed 
Classification 




Predicted Classification  
Honest Fraud Total 
 
Honest Fraud Total 
Honest 107 21 128 
 
Honest 55 17 72 
Fraud 41 58 99 
 
Fraud 35 46 81 
Total 148 79 227 
 
Total 90 63 153 
The confusion matrices above represent a Percentage of Correct Classifications of 72.7% 
for the Training Sample and 66.0% for the Test Sample, as presented below: 
 
% Training Test 
PCC 72,7% 66,0% 
Sensitivity 58,6% 56,8% 
Specificity 83,6% 76,4% 
AUROC 82,1% 68,9% 
Similarly to the Logit model results, results for the CHAID model are within range of what 
is commonly considered fair. Comparative results between both models will be further 
detailed in the following section. 
Table 9 – Confusion Matrices for the CHAID Model – Results 










Percentage Correctly Classified (PCC) 
Training Sample Test Sample 
0% 43,6% 52,9% 
10% 58,1% 65,4% 
20% 63,0% 65,4% 
30% 65,6% 64,7% 
40% 71,4% 63,4% 
50% 72,7% 66,0% 
60% 71,8% 58,2% 
70% 66,5% 54,2% 
80% 66,5% 54,2% 
90% 66,5% 54,2% 
100% 56,4% 47,1% 
Contrary to the Logit model, and from the presented cut-off points, the 50% cut-off is the 
one that provides the most accurate results, both for the Training and Test Samples. 
Additional detail is included in Appendix 2. 
Comparative Results between Logit and CHAID 
As the final part of this results’ section, we discuss the comparative results between the 
alternate methodologies applied, in what concerns their accuracy and performance, as well 




50% cut-off Training Test Training Test 
PCC 69,6% 65,4% 72,7% 66,0% 
Sensitivity 60,6% 59,3% 58,6% 56,8% 
Specificity 76,6% 72,2% 83,6% 76,4% 
AUROC 75,3% 71,5% 82,1% 68,9% 
Table 11 – PCC simulation for different cut-off points in the CHAID Model 





When comparing performance indicators for both techniques, one might argue that the 
similarities are greater than the differences. Concerning the PCC, Sensitivity and 
Specificity indicators, the differences between the Logit and CHAID models can be 
considered residual, at best. Overall, one could say that there is no relevant difference in 
accuracy between the two selected models, in this data set, with a slight advantage to the 
Logit model in terms of Area Under the ROC Curve. 
One noticeable difference, however, lies in the loss of accuracy when changing from the 
Training Sample to the Test Sample. While Logit obtains slightly lower results for the 
training sample’s PCC, Specificity and AUROC, the decrease that these results show for 
the test sample is also lower. This is particularly noticeable for the AUROC indicator. 
While Logit loses 3.8 points, the CHAID value for the test sample is 12.2 points lower than 
the one for the training sample. One might consider that this difference reveals an abnormal 
level of over-fitting to the training sample data that might question the model’s use in other 
datasets. 
As a final note, Picture 3 above shows the ROC curves for both models, as approximated 
by the different cut-off threshold simulations detailed in the previous sections and the 






















Receiving Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve






matching appendices. As shown, the two curves intercept repeatedly, disallowing a clear 








The work conducted in this thesis has shown an application of data mining software and 
techniques in the prediction of automobile insurance fraud. 
Using information available in most insurance companies’ databases, in the form of 17 
variables that contained characteristics of the policy, the policy holder, the vehicle and the 
loss event, the Logit model and the CHAID model derived were able to correctly classify 
65.4% and 66.0% of claims in the test sample, respectively, which are considered fair 
results. Each of 380 claims was classified as fraudulent if the probability-like score 
computed by the models was above 0.5.  
In conclusion, the use of the demonstrated tools and techniques enabled the identification of 
underlying fraud patterns, specific to the raw data used to build the model. Despite the 
overall accuracy of approximately 66%, key variables were shown to have a significant 
impact in the outcome of the predicted variable.   
The models derived in this thesis suggest a number of “fraud indicators” specific to the 
used dataset. 
Concerning the Logit model, on average, the higher the number of years since the policy 
was signed, the lower the association with fraudulent claims. The same was true for the 
number of policy holders. The client’s age was also identified as a significant factor – the 
average age for the claimant was significantly lower in the population of fraudulent claims 
than on the legitimate one. Not admitting fault in the accident that led to the claim was also 
considered an overall suspicious factor, as well as paying premiums semiannually instead 
of annually. 
Concerning the CHAID model, the most significant fraud indicator, and the first split to be 
applied to the full training sample, was the number of policy holders. Further in the 
decision tree, and taking into account the sub-populations found after each split, variables 
such as the policy’s tenure, semiannual payments and the client’s age were considered 





model. The third and fourth level splits used variables not significant in the Logit model, 
such as the flag for an accident in a geographical area different from the client’s residential 
area or the number of days between the accident and the filing of the claim. This has 
extended the list of possible “fraud indicators” seen in this dataset, even if only applicable 
to smaller sub-populations. 
A comparison of the two derived models was performed, generating very similar 
performance results between the Logit and CHAID models. Aside from the small 
difference in the percentage of correctly classified claims, mentioned above, the AUROC 
indicators differ from 71.5% for the Logit to 68.9% in CHAID. 
Perhaps the most noticeable difference is that the tree based algorithm is showing a 
decrease in AUROC levels from 82.1% in the training sample, to 68.9% in the test sample. 
This decrease was considered relevant, and suggests some level of over-fitting to the 
training sample data. 
As a final note, the purpose of this work was not solely to present a set of fraud indicators 
that would help insurance companies target fraudulent behavior in their insurance policies. 
This thesis aims to present an application of how investing in data mining techniques might 
be rewarding in the fight against fraudulent behavior. Rather than targeting policies with 
semiannual payments because it is a significant variable in both models, for instance, 
companies are encouraged to identify specific fraud indicators in their datasets, taking into 
account the specificities not found in articles or other academic papers, such as the 






7.  Limitations and Next Steps 
The work developed in this thesis follows a set of assumptions that limits the use of the 
referred techniques in a real life context, for an insurance company. The following 
illustrates the limitations of this work. 
The first limitation is the assumption that all fraudulent claimants in the dataset are 
committing the same kind of fraud. This is incurred by working with a binary target 
variable Fraud that assigns the same value to every kind of fraudulent behavior, and can 
decrease quality in the results. As in Belhadji et al. (2010), the model is only estimating a 
probability for a general type of fraud. 
While the goal of fraud analysts is to detect any and all kinds of fraud, assigning equal 
relevance to every kind is a simplification not recommended in a real life application. 
Suppose, for illustrative purposes, that fraud type A is very frequent among the younger 
policy holders, while fraud type B is most often perpetrated by the elder: Assigning the 
same target value to both fraud type A and B will add noise to the model’s characterization 
of fraudulent claims. In the referred example, there is a possibility that the average age of 
fraudulent claimants might suggest middle aged people as fraudsters, which, in this 
example, is not the case.  
To deal with this limitation, one could attempt to define various fraud types and assign one 
to each fraudulent claim. Data mining techniques, such as classification trees or multiple 
logistical regressions, could then attempt to classify claims as legitimate or fraudulent, for 
each of the specific fraud types. Additionally, and because there may be fraud types 
unknown to the user, one is advised to use clustering techniques that may reveal different 
groups of fraudulent claims, separating, for instance, claimants incurring in fraud type A 
from those incurring in fraud type B, as above. These alternatives, however, fall beyond the 
scope of this work, and are suggested for further study. 
This thesis is focused in demonstrating the applicability of data mining techniques towards 





fraudulent, this is not sufficient to save the insurance company from reimbursing the 
claimant. Taking in consideration that the model assigns a greater fraud probability to 
specific claims, the insurer may find benefits when choosing to audit those specific claims, 
instead of purely random ones. This is also referred in Belhadji et al. (2010). However, 
further applications would need to be conducted in order to estimate and prove these 
benefits, and a likely subject of further studies. 
The last limitation to be depicted in this section, and as in most data mining applications, is 
the fact that they are intrinsically dependant on the dataset they were applied on. As 
mentioned in prior chapters, only fraudulent claims that were perceived by the insurance 
company as fraudulent, and only after an in-depth investigation, were considered 
automobile insurance fraud. Each fraudulent claim that the insurer fails to detect will be 
adding noise to statistical models in place, and results should always be interpreted 
cautiously. Moreover, any data mining derived model can only identify fraudulent patterns 
related to data collected in the adequate time intervals. The more the variables, and the 
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Sensitivity Specificity PCC 
0% 227 99 0 128 0 100% 0% 43,6% 
10% 217 97 8 120 2 98% 6% 46,3% 
20% 189 89 28 100 10 90% 22% 51,5% 
30% 153 83 58 70 16 84% 45% 62,1% 
40% 126 76 78 50 23 77% 61% 67,8% 
50% 90 60 98 30 39 61% 77% 69,6% 
60% 64 48 112 16 51 48% 88% 70,5% 
70% 33 30 125 3 69 30% 98% 68,3% 
80% 4 4 128 0 95 4% 100% 58,1% 
90% 2 2 128 0 97 2% 100% 57,3% 

















Sensitivity Specificity PCC 
0% 153 81 0 72 0 100% 0% 52,9% 
10% 146 81 7 65 0 100% 10% 57,5% 
20% 130 75 17 55 6 93% 24% 60,1% 
30% 114 71 29 43 10 88% 40% 65,4% 
40% 89 60 43 29 21 74% 60% 67,3% 
50% 68 48 52 20 33 59% 72% 65,4% 
60% 52 36 56 16 45 44% 78% 60,1% 
70% 33 26 65 7 55 32% 90% 59,5% 
80% 11 8 69 3 73 10% 96% 50,3% 
90% 3 2 71 1 79 2% 99% 47,7% 























Sensitivity Specificity PCC 
0% 227 99 0 128 0 100% 0% 43,6% 
10% 194 99 33 95 0 100% 26% 58,1% 
20% 181 98 45 83 1 99% 35% 63,0% 
30% 171 96 53 75 3 97% 41% 65,6% 
40% 122 78 84 44 21 79% 66% 71,4% 
50% 79 58 107 21 41 59% 84% 72,7% 
60% 57 46 117 11 53 46% 91% 71,8% 
70% 23 23 128 0 76 23% 100% 66,5% 
80% 23 23 128 0 76 23% 100% 66,5% 
90% 23 23 128 0 76 23% 100% 66,5% 

















Sensitivity Specificity PCC 
0% 153 81 0 72 0 100% 0% 52,9% 
10% 126 77 23 49 4 95% 32% 65,4% 
20% 116 72 28 44 9 89% 39% 65,4% 
30% 113 70 29 43 11 86% 40% 64,7% 
40% 91 58 39 33 23 72% 54% 63,4% 
50% 63 46 55 17 35 57% 76% 66,0% 
60% 47 32 57 15 49 40% 79% 58,2% 
70% 15 13 70 2 68 16% 97% 54,2% 
80% 15 13 70 2 68 16% 97% 54,2% 
90% 15 13 70 2 68 16% 97% 54,2% 






CHAID and Exhaustive CHAID Algorithm, as performed in SPSS Modeler® 
The CHAID algorithm is originally proposed by Kass (1980) and the Exhaustive CHAID is 
by Biggs et al (1991). Algorithm CHAID and Exhaustive CHAID allow multiple splits of a 
node. 
Both CHAID and exhaustive CHAID algorithms consist of three steps: merging, splitting 
and stopping. A tree is grown by repeatedly using these three steps on each node starting 
from the root node. 
Merging 
For each predictor variable X, merge non-significant categories. Each final category 
of X will result in one child node if X is used to split the node. The merging step also 
calculates the adjusted p-value that is to be used in the splitting step. 
1. If X has 1 category only, stop and set the adjusted p-value to be 1. 
2. If X has 2 categories, go to step 8. 
3. Else, find the allowable pair of categories of X (an allowable pair of categories for 
ordinal predictor is two adjacent categories, and for nominal predictor is any two 
categories) that is least significantly different (i.e., most similar). The most similar pair is 
the pair whose test statistic gives the largest p-value with respect to the dependent 
variable Y. How to calculate p-value under various situations will be described in later 
sections. 
4. For the pair having the largest p-value, check if its p-value is larger than a user-specified 
alpha-level α merge . If it does, this pair is merged into a single compound category. Then a 
new set of categories of X is formed. If it does not, then go to step 7. 
5. (Optional) If the newly formed compound category consists of three or more original 
categories, then find the best binary split within the compound category which p-value is 






6. Go to step 2. 
7. (Optional) Any category having too few observations (as compared with a user-specified 
minimum segment size) is merged with the most similar other category as measured by the 
largest of the p-values. 
8. The adjusted p-value is computed for the merged categories by applying Bonferroni 
adjustments that are to be discussed later. 
Splitting 
The “best” split for each predictor is found in the merging step. The splitting step selects 
which predictor to be used to best split the node. Selection is accomplished by comparing 
the adjusted p-value associated with each predictor. The adjusted p-value is obtained in the 
merging step. 
1. Select the predictor that has the smallest adjusted p-value (i.e., most significant). 
2. If this adjusted p-value is less than or equal to a user-specified alpha-level α split , split 
the node using this predictor. Else, do not split and the node is considered as a terminal 
node. 
Stopping 
The stopping step checks if the tree growing process should be stopped according to the 
following stopping rules. 
1. If a node becomes pure; that is, all cases in a node have identical values of the dependent 
variable, the node will not be split. 
2. If all cases in a node have identical values for each predictor, the node will not be split. 
3. If the current tree depth reaches the user specified maximum tree depth limit value, the 





4. If the size of a node is less than the user-specified minimum node size value, the node 
will not be split. 
5. If the split of a node results in a child node whose node size is less than the user-
specified minimum child node size value, child nodes that have too few cases (as compared 
with this minimum) will merge with the most similar child node as measured by the largest 
of the p-values. However, if the resulting number of child nodes is 1, the node will not be 
split. 
 
